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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The State appeals from the district court’s order granting Christopher Martinez’s motion
to suppress. This Court should affirm because the district court correctly concluded that the
officer who initiated the traffic stop of the vehicle in which Mr. Martinez was a passenger
deviated from the legitimate purpose of the stop for at least 30 seconds to effectuate a drug
investigation absent reasonable suspicion of drug activity, which violated Mr. Martinez’s rights
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The district court also correctly
concluded that suppression of the evidence found in the vehicle was warranted because neither
the inevitable discovery nor the attenuation exceptions apply.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Just before midnight on August 19, 2016, Officers Josh Sontag and Michelle Havens saw
a vehicle fail to signal a turn when exiting a parking lot. (R., p.147.) The vehicle pulled into a
gas station, and the officers pulled in behind the vehicle and activated their lights. (R., p.147;
2/6/17 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-16, p.11, Ls.7-20.)

The driver and the passenger exited the vehicle.

(R., p.147.) Officer Sontag recognized the passenger, Mr. Martinez, because he had “dealt with
him before.” (R., pp.147-48.) Officer Havens asked Mr. Martinez for his identification, and
Mr. Martinez did not provide it. (R., p.148.) Officer Havens instructed Mr. Martinez to either
get back in the vehicle for the remainder of the stop, or stand on the sidewalk by the convenience
store. (R., p.148.) Mr. Martinez chose to stand by the convenience store. (R., p.148.)
While Mr. Martinez stood by the convenience store, Officer Sontag questioned the driver,
who said she was on parole for “possessing pills,” but denied having any pills on her person.
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(R., p.148.) Officer Sontag advised the driver she was stopped for failing to signal, and asked
again about her parole status. (R., p.148.) After approximately 1 minute 45 seconds, Officer
Havens asked Officer Sontag whether she should call for a drug dog, and Officer Havens
answered, “Yes, please.”

(R., p.148, n.14.)

The district court found this became a drug

investigation instead of a traffic investigation “from the moment the officers learned the driver
was on parole for a prior drug offense.” (R., p.164.)
Officer Sontag continued questioning the driver, and learned her license was expired.
(R., p.149.) Officer Havens decided to pat-down the driver, and Mr. Martinez shouted at the
officers from the curb. (R., p.149.) While Officer Havens was patting down the driver, now in
handcuffs, Officer Sontag left to “deal with” Mr. Martinez, still shouting from afar. (R., p.149.)
Officer Sontag told Mr. Martinez he was interfering with the traffic stop and gave him “one
warning” to sit down. (R., p.149.) Officer Sontag told Mr. Martinez if he started talking again,
he would be arrested for interfering in an investigation. (R., p.149.)
Approximately 7 minutes 40 seconds into the stop, Officer Sontag began writing a traffic
citation for the driver. (R., p.150.) Approximately 9 minutes 20 seconds into the stop, Officer
Sontag stopped writing the citation and walked away from his patrol car. (R., p.150.) Officer
Williams had arrived on-scene with his drug dog. (R., p.150.) Officer Williams asked Officer
Sontag whether he was writing a citation, and Officer Sontag said he was. (R., p.150.) Officer
Sontag’s on-body video recording of the stop ends at the 9 minute 27 second mark. (R., p.150.)
Officer Sontag testified he turned off his on-body camera while he had a discussion with Officer
Williams for “no more than a couple minutes.” (R., p.150; 6/23/17 Tr., p.14, Ls.10-14, p.19,
Ls.6-12.)

Officer Williams testified the conversation was a “[c]ouple of seconds maybe.”

(R., p.150; 6/23/17 Tr., p.25, Ls.20-23.)
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The second track of Officer Sontag’s on-body recording appears to pick up immediately
after the first track ends, though there is no audio until 30 seconds into the recording.
(R., p.150.) The district court found “it is clearly apparent that Officer Sontag is still talking
with Corporal Williams during this time.” (R., p.150.) Thus, Officer Sontag talked to Officer
Williams for at least 30 seconds, but it could have been longer depending on whether Officer
Sontag had his video off for seconds or minutes. (R., p.150.) In any case, Officer Sontag
resumed writing the citation 45 seconds into the second track of the video recording, and the
drug dog began sniffing the vehicle. (R., pp.150-51.) The district court found Officer Sontag
“appeared to pause several times while writing the citation.” (R., p.151.) The drug dog finished
sniffing the vehicle while Officer Sontag was still ostensibly writing the citation. (R., p.151.)
Officer Williams testified the drug dog alerted three times on the vehicle. (R., p.151; 6/23/17
Tr., p.26, Ls.16-22.)
Officers Sontag and Williams searched the vehicle and found drugs and drug
paraphernalia inside. (R., p.151.) At some point after the search of the vehicle, the officers
learned there were two outstanding arrest warrants for Mr. Martinez. (R., p.151.) Mr. Martinez
was arrested and ultimately charged by Information with possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.59-60, 151.) The State filed
an Information Part II alleging Mr. Martinez should be sentenced as a persistent violator
pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2514. (R., pp.85-86.) Mr. Martinez filed a motion to suppress.
(R., pp.110-28.) The district court held a hearing on Mr. Martinez’s motion to suppress, and
heard testimony from Officers Sontag and Williams. (R., pp.142-43.) The district court also
considered by stipulation the transcript of the preliminary hearing, Officer Havens’ supplemental
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police report, and the two-part video recording of the stop from Officer Sontag’s on-body video
camera. (R., p.147, n.1; 6/23/17 Tr., p.5, L.12 – p.6, L.24.)
Following the hearing, the district court issued a lengthy and well-reasoned memorandum
decision and order granting Mr. Martinez’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.146-67.) The district
court first concluded Mr. Martinez had standing to challenge the seizure of the evidence from the
car. (R., p.153.) The district court next concluded Officer Sontag deviated from the original
purpose of the stop in order to coordinate a drug investigation with Officer Williams, absent
reasonable suspicion of drug activity. (R., pp.154-59.) The district court then rejected the
State’s argument that the drugs and drug paraphernalia would have inevitably been discovered,
and concluded the suppressed evidence was not admissible under the attenuation doctrine.
(R., pp.160-65.) The State filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.177-80.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court correctly grant Mr. Martinez’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Martinez’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The district court found “Officer Sontag stopped writing the traffic citation and deviated

from the original purpose of the stop as soon as Corporal Williams arrived with his K-9.”
(R., p.157.) The court further found “the most probable inference is that the conversation
[between Officers Sontag and Williams] concerned the drug investigation and deploying the drug
dog” but “[r]egardless of the topic of conversation, it is clear that Officer Sontag deviated from
the purpose of the traffic stop (i.e., a citation for failing to signal) in order to coordinate with
Corporal Williams to effectuate a drug investigation.” (R., p.157.). The district court correctly
concluded Officer Sontag deviated from the purpose of the stop to coordinate a drug
investigation, absent reasonable suspicion of drug activity, and that deviation violated
Mr. Martinez’s rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.1 The
district court also correctly concluded suppression of the evidence found in the vehicle was
warranted because neither the inevitable discovery nor the attenuation exceptions apply.

B.

Standard Of Review
“In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

the standard of review is bifurcated.” State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009) (citation
omitted). “This Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. However, this Court may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional
1

The State did not argue in the district court that the officers had reasonable suspicion of drug
activity prior to the drug dog’s alert. (See R., pp.158, 165-66.) The State does not challenge on
appeal the district court’s conclusion that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the
traffic stop into a drug investigation. (See generally Appellant’s Br., pp.1-12.)
6

principles in light of the facts found.” Id. (citations omitted). “At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App.
2005) (citations omitted).

C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded Officer Sontag Deviated From The Purpose Of
The Stop To Coordinate A Drug Investigation Absent Reasonable Suspicion Of Drug
Activity, And That Deviation Violated Mr. Martinez’s Rights Under The Fourth
Amendment Of The United States Constitution
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const., amend. IV. In State v. Linze, the Idaho Supreme Court
explained that a traffic stop is a reasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment “so long as
there is a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws.” 161
Idaho 605, 609 (2016) (citation omitted). “The stop remains a reasonable seizure while the
officer diligently pursues the purpose of the stop, to which that reasonable suspicion is related.”
Id.
However, should the officer abandon the purpose of the stop, the officer no longer
has that original reasonable suspicion supporting his actions. Indeed, when an
officer abandons his or her original purpose, the officer has for all intents and
purposes initiated a new seizure with a new purpose; one which requires its own
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. This new seizure cannot piggyback on the reasonableness of the original seizure.
Id. In the present case, the district court correctly concluded Officer Sontag deviated from the
original purpose of the stop, which was to investigate the traffic violation, when he stopped
writing a citation for the driver for at least 30 seconds in order to coordinate a drug investigation
with Officer Williams. (R., p.165.) Because the seizure for the drug investigation was not
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supported by reasonable suspicion, and cannot piggy-back on the reasonableness of the original
seizure, it violated Mr. Martinez’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.
The State argues in its Appellant’s Brief that Officer Sontag “took a short time to inform
[Officer Williams] of the relevant facts regarding the situation then presented” and argues “[o]ne
officer informing another officer at the scene about relevant information related to the stop was
not a ‘deviation’ nor an ‘abandonment’ of the traffic investigation.” (Appellant’s Br., p.6.) The
State ignores the district court’s factual finding that “the most probable inference is that the
conversation [between Officers Sontag and Williams] concerned the drug investigation and
deploying the drug dog.” (R., p.157.) This is a critical factual finding, which the State does not
challenge on appeal. Moreover, the district court concluded that “[r]egardless of the topic of
conversation, it is clear that Officer Sontag deviated from the purpose of the traffic stop (i.e., a
citation for failing to signal) in order to coordinate with Corporal Williams to effectuate a drug
investigation.” (Id.) The district court correctly concluded this violated Mr. Martinez’s Fourth
Amendment rights under Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015), and Linze.
In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held a traffic stop’s purpose does not
encompass “[o]n-scene investigation into other crimes.” 135 S.Ct. at 1616.

Instead, “the

tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s
‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, and attend to related safety
concerns.” Id. at 1614 (internal citations omitted). Here, the district court found Officer Sontag
deviated from the purpose of the stop, thus prolonging the stop by at least 30 seconds, in order to
coordinate a drug investigation. (R., p.157.) This was not within the scope of the traffic stop’s
mission, and was not supported by reasonable suspicion.
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The State claims that “[b]ecause officer safety is within the scope of the mission of the
traffic stop, the brief discussion between officers concerning the circumstances being confronted
by the officers prior to the deployment of the drug dog was not a deviation from or abandonment
of the purposes of the traffic stop.” (Appellant’s Br., p.7.) But this ignores the Supreme Court’s
distinction in Rodriguez between officer safety concerns pertaining to the original purpose of the
stop, and officer safety concerns pertaining to an extension of the stop for which the officers lack
reasonable suspicion. Extending the stop for the former is permissible; extending the stop for the
latter is not. See Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1615. This is because a drug dog sniff is not an
ordinary incident of a traffic stop, and cannot fairly be characterized as “part of the officer’s
traffic mission.” Id. A drug dog sniff is instead a measure aimed at detecting evidence of
criminal wrongdoing and constitutes a detour from the original purpose of the stop, as do safety
precaution taken in order to facilitate such a detour. Id. at 1616. Where, as here, an officer
prolongs a stop in order to conduct an unrelated detour which measurably extends the stop, even
for a short period of time, the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures is
violated. Id. at 1612.
In Linze, the Idaho Supreme Court emphasized that, when a drug dog sniff occurs
contemporaneously with a traffic stop, the pertinent inquiry is not when the sniff occurs or how
expeditiously the officers conduct the traffic-based inquiries, but whether conducting the sniff
prolongs or adds time to the stop. 161 Idaho at 609. The State attempts to distinguish Linze
because, unlike the officer in Linze, Officer Sontag did not participate in the drug investigation.
(Appellant’s Br., pp.6-7.) The argument ignores the district court’s finding that Officer Sontag
deviated from the purpose of the stop “in order to coordinate with Corporal Williams to
effectuate a drug investigation.” (R., p.157.). Thus, Officer Sontag clearly participated in the
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drug investigation. The fact that he did not run the drug dog around the vehicle is of no legal
significance, as the critical factor is the deviation from the original purpose. See Linze, 161
Idaho at 609. Where, as here, an officer deviates from or abandons the original purpose of a
traffic stop in order to pursue a drug investigation absent reasonable suspicion of drug activity,
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures is violated.

D.

The District Court Correctly Concluded Suppression Was Warranted
The State argues that even if the district court correctly concluded the prolonged seizure

of Mr. Martinez violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment, the district court erred when it
concluded suppression of the evidence found in the vehicle was warranted because the officers
did not acquire the evidence by exploitation of the illegality, relying on the inevitable discovery
and attenuation exceptions to the exclusionary rule. (Appellant’s Br., p.7.) The district court
correctly concluded that neither the inevitable discovery nor the attenuation exceptions apply.

1.

The Inevitable Discovery Exception To The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply

“[T]he inevitable discovery doctrine asks courts to engage in a hypothetical finding into
the lawful actions law enforcement would have inevitably taken in the absence of the unlawful
avenue that led to the evidence. The premise is that law enforcement should be in the same, not
a worse, position than they would have been absent the misconduct.” State v. Downing, 163
Idaho 26, 407 P.3d 1285, 1290 (2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The State
appears to misapprehend the premise of the inevitable discovery exception, arguing “[t]he brief
illegality in [Mr. Martinez’s] detention did not have any connection with the probable cause
generated by the dog alert.” (Appellant’s Br., p.8.) But the illegality found by the district court
was not, as the State asserts, “a short deviation from the traffic stop that ended prior to the
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initiation of the dog sniff.” (Appellant’s Br., p.8.) Instead, the illegality was that Mr. Martinez
was seized in violation of his constitutional rights when Officer Sontag deviated from the
legitimate purpose of the traffic stop to coordinate a drug investigation. The fact that the drug
dog ultimately alerted cannot be used to retroactively justify the unlawful seizure.
The State argues the district court applied an improper legal standard, and, under the
proper legal standard, the evidence discovered in the vehicle would have inevitably been
discovered because “[t]he drug dog sniff was an action that actually took place and inevitably
would have led to the discovery of the evidence regardless of the less-than-two-minute deviation
from the purposes of the traffic stop.” (Appellant’s Br., p.9.) The State ignores the fact that the
drug dog sniff should not have taken place—that is, Mr. Martinez’s detention should not have
been prolonged to permit a drug investigation. The fact that the impermissible drug dog sniff
ultimately led to the discovery of illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia does not somehow make
the prolonged detention lawful.

The Court of Appeals has made clear that the inevitable

discovery doctrine “‘is not intended to swallow the exclusionary rule whole by substituting what
the police should have done for what they really did.” State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 170
(Ct. App. 2011) (quoting State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 226 (Ct. App. 1984)). That the police
may have been able to conduct a drug dog sniff without unlawfully prolonging Mr. Martinez’s
detention does not excuse the fact that they unlawfully prolonged his detention.
In Liechty, the Court of Appeals held the district court correctly concluded the defendant
was seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when a police officer approached the
vehicle he was in and initiated questioning by opening the vehicle’s door without his consent.
152 Idaho at 168. The Court then rejected the State’s argument that the evidence found in the
vehicle should not be suppressed under the inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. at 170. In doing
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so, the Court framed the issue as “whether an additional line of investigation would have
revealed the methamphetamine [located in the vehicle], not whether the evidence would have
been discovered had the encounter between the officer and Liechty not occurred while the officer
was standing in the open passenger doorway.” Id. The Court said it “decline[d] to predict how
such a conversation would have unfolded” and concluded the inevitable discovery doctrine did
not apply because “[t]he record does not disclose any additional line of investigation . . . .” Id.
Similarly here, this Court should not guess at how the encounter might have proceeded
had Officer Sontag not deviated from the legitimate purpose of the stop to coordinate a drug
investigation. Like in Liechty, the officers were not pursuing an additional line of investigation
that might have led to the discovery of the contraband in the vehicle. The Idaho Supreme Court
explained in Downing that “[t]he [inevitable discovery] doctrine must presuppose inevitable
hypotheticals running in parallel to the illegal actions, not in series flowing directly from the
officers’ unlawful conduct.” Downing, 163 Idaho at __, 407 P.3d at 1291. Here, the discovery
of the contraband in the vehicle resulted from the drug dog alert, which stemmed directly from
Officer Sontag’s unlawful deviation from the legitimate purpose of the stop. The inevitable
discovery doctrine does not apply.

2.

The Attenuation Exception To The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply

Under the attenuation doctrine, “[e]vidence is admissible when the connection between
the unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is so remote or has been interrupted by
some intervening circumstance, so that the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that
has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” Utah v. Strieff,
136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016).

When determining whether unlawful conduct has been

sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of unlawful police conduct, this Court considers the
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following three factors: “(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the
evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of
the improper law enforcement action.” State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846 (2004) (citation
omitted).
Here, it is undisputed that the first factor weighs against a finding of attenuation, as only
a few minutes elapsed between Mr. Martinez’s unlawful seizure and the discovery of the
evidence in the vehicle. See Strieff, 136 S.Ct. at 2062 (“Our precedents have declined to find
that this factor favors attenuation unless ‘substantial time’ elapses between an unlawful act and
when the evidence is obtained.”) (citation omitted). The district court concluded the next two
factors also weigh against a finding of attenuation because there were no intervening
circumstances, and the officers’ misconduct was flagrant because they pursued a drug
investigation from the moment they learned the driver was on parole for a drug offense.
(R., pp.163-64.) The State takes issue with these two findings, but its arguments are unavailing.
With respect to the second factor, the State argues “the dog alert was an intervening
circumstance because it was not caused by the allegedly improper deviation from the traffic
stop.” (Appellant’s Br., p.11.) This is simply not true. The officers deviated from the legitimate
purpose of the traffic stop in order to coordinate and conduct a drug investigation. (R., p.157.)
The drug dog sniff (and, ultimately, alert) was part of the unlawful drug investigation. It was
thus not an intervening circumstance like the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant in
Strieff.2

Because the drug dog alert was a direct consequence of the illegally prolonged

2

While there were outstanding arrest warrants for Mr. Martinez, the district court found they
were not discovered until after the drug dog alerted and thus were not an intervening
circumstance. (R., p.163.) The State does not challenge this finding on appeal, and argues
instead that the dog sniff itself was the intervening circumstance. (Appellant’s Br., pp.10-11.)
13

detention, it was not an intervening circumstance.
With respect to the third factor, the district court found this weighed against attenuation
because “it is clear that this was as a drug investigation from the moment the officers learned the
driver was on parole for a prior drug offense.” (R., p.164.) The State argues on appeal that the
officers’ conduct was not flagrant, relying on Strieff. (Appellants’ Br., p.12.) But Strieff is
inapposite. Unlike in Strieff, there is no indication the officers here made any good faith
mistake, and there is every indication this was not a single, isolated event of misconduct. See
Strieff, 136 S.Ct. at 2063. It has long been established that officers cannot conduct a drug
investigation during a traffic stop absent reasonable suspicion or probable cause of drug activity.
The fact that the driver of a vehicle is on parole for a prior drug offense does not provide
reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a drug investigation.
Even if this Court concludes the officers’ misconduct was not flagrant, suppression is still
warranted considering the short time that elapsed between the police misconduct and the
acquisition of the evidence and the lack of any intervening circumstances. This district court
concluded as much, relying on Liechty. (R., p.165.) In Liechty, the Court of Appeals concluded
the attenuation doctrine did not apply even though the officer did not appear to act flagrantly or
with an improper purpose when he opened the door of the defendant’s vehicle to question him,
without his consent, absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 152 Idaho at 170. The
Court reasoned that the defendant’s arrest was the “direct result of questions posed by the officer
while standing in the open passenger doorway” and thus “was not the product of some other
intervening circumstance . . . .” The same is true here, and this Court should reach the same
result.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Martinez respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order
granting his motion to suppress.
DATED this 18th day of April, 2018.
____________/s/__________________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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